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Abstract—Personal sensory data is used by context-aware
mobile applications to provide utility. However, the same data
can also be used by an adversary to make sensitive inferences
about a user thereby violating her privacy.
We present DEEProtect, a framework that enables a novel
form of inference control, in which mobile apps with access to sen-
sor data are limited (provably) in their ability to make inferences
about user’s sensitive data and behavior. DEEProtect adopts a
two-layered privacy strategy. First, it leverages novel autoencoder
techniques to perform data minimization and limits the amount
of information being shared; the learning network is used to
derive a compact representation of sensor data consisting only
of features relevant to authorized utility-providing inferences.
Second, DEEProtect obfuscates the previously learnt features,
thereby providing an additional layer of protection against
sensitive inferences. Our framework supports both conventional
as well as a novel relaxed notion of local differential privacy
that enhances utility. Through theoretical analysis and extensive
experiments using real-world datasets, we demonstrate that when
compared to existing approaches DEEProtect provides provable
privacy guarantees with up to 8x improvement in utility. Finally,
DEEProtect shares obfuscated but raw sensor data reconstructed
from the perturbed features, thus requiring no changes to the
existing app interfaces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices such as smartphones and wearable devices
are increasingly gaining popularity as platforms for collecting
and sharing sensor data. These devices, often equipped with
sensors such as accelerometer, orientation sensor, magnetome-
ter, camera, microphone, GPS and so on, are being used by
mobile sensing systems to make sophisticated inferences about
users. These inferences have in turn enabled an entire ecosys-
tem of context-aware apps such as behavior-based authentica-
tion [31], [47], [58], [18], [78], [94], fitness monitoring based
on activity tracking [5], [76], [57], speech translation [48],
[61] and traffic/environmental monitoring [3], [64], [83], [86].
While shared data has enabled context-aware apps to pro-
vide utility to the users, the same data can also be used by
an adversary to make inferences that are possibly sensitive to
the user such as speaker identity [52], [66], keystroke detec-
tion [91], [54], [13], [59], [63], location tracking [12], [45],
[66], device placement [68], onscreen taps recognition [62],
onset of stress [55], [16] and detection of emotional state [16],
[74]. Therefore, there exist fundamentally conflicting require-
ments between protecting privacy of the sensitive information
contained in mobile sensor data and preserving utility of the
same data for authorized inferences. We consider the following
case studies that further illustrate this privacy-utility tradeoff:
• Case Study 1: A user shares accelerometer data with an
authentication app that performs keyless validation of user
identity (useful inference) [31], [47], [58]. But the same data
can also be used to infer the activity mode of the user – if
she is walking, or standing still, or moving up or down the
stairs (sensitive inferences) [5], [76], [57] – which in turn
may lead to more serious inferences regarding living habits
and health conditions.
• Case Study 2: A user shares accelerometer data with a real-
time life-logging app that helps with travel planning (useful
inferences) [45], [34]. However, the same data can also be
maliciously used to extract sequences of the user’s entered
text (e.g., Passwords or PINs) (sensitive inference) [91],
[62], [13], [59].
• Case Study 3: A user shares speech data with a voice-
based search app that translates speech to text for web
searches (useful inference) [48], [61]. But the same data
can also be used to recognize the user’s identity (sensitive
inference) [52], [66], compromising her privacy.
Recently, several sensor privacy protection mechanisms
(SPPMs) have been proposed [7], [39], [19], [79], [22], [21],
[49], [33], [15], [4]. However, most existing SPPMs only
provide binary access control over the sensor data that requires
users to choose between sharing or blocking a sensor –
limiting their applicability and adoption [33], [79], [7], [39].
A limited set of SPPMs that do focus on obfuscating sensor
data, however, lack provable privacy guarantees [15], [4].
In this paper, we propose a new framework called DEEPro-
tect that mediates privacy-preserving access to mobile sensor
data. DEEProtect enables a new permission model where
instead of blocking or allowing sensors, the system specifies
the utility and privacy preferences in terms of inferences
that can be derived from mobile sensor data. The overall
information flow of DEEProtect is summarized in Figure 1.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a
rigorous approach for inference control on smartphones.
In DEEProtect, the system configuration can specify
as input a set of useful/authorized inferences denoted by
U(D) = {U1(D), U2(D), · · · }, e.g., behavior-based authen-
tication, speech-to-text translation. All other inferences are
considered sensitive by default. Alternatively, a subset of
inferences can be specified as being sensitive, which is denoted
by S(D) = {S1(D), S2(D), · · · }, e.g., detection of the text
entered in keyboard, speaker identity recognition. Note that
we provide a list of possible inferences as input interface of
our system. In our setting, inferences represent functions that
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Fig. 1. DEEProtect mediates privacy-preserving access to mobile sen-
sor data through inference control. Mobile apps can access obfuscated
sensor data for providing utility, but are provably limited in their
ability to infer sensitive information.
map the mobile sensor data to their corresponding inference
results (i.e., labels). These functions could vary in complexity
from linear to highly non-linear models. Outgoing sensor data
is initially intercepted by DEEProtect, which obfuscates the
data before sharing such that U(D) can be derived accurately
by the app and S(D) is kept private.
To provide provable privacy guarantees for a single user’s
mobile sensor stream, we exploit local differential pri-
vacy [23], [30], [73] to obfuscate the mobile sensor data–which
unlike differential privacy [24], [27], [25], [29], [26] does not
require a multi-user setting. However, adding noise directly to
the high-dimensional data reduces its utility significantly.
Towards this end, we propose a computationally efficient
mechanism that strikes an enhanced balance between utility
and privacy guarantees. We start with a data minimization
step, in which we leverage a novel proposal of a supervised
autoencoder to extract features that are relevant only to the
useful inferences. The reduced dimensionality of the data
helps improve the overall system utility. Then, we perturb
these extracted features, using either the conventional local
differential privacy framework [23], [30], [73] or our relaxed
notion of local differential privacy, depending on the specifica-
tion of sensitive inferences. Finally, we reconstruct obfuscated
sensor data from the perturbed features such that the existing
interfaces for mobile apps can continue to work without any
change. Note that our approach is of independent interest even
outside the context of smartphone applications. For example,
our algorithm can be applied to enforce general data protection
regulation (GDPR) in the European Union laws, in the context
of protecting user privacy.
Contributions: We summarize our contributions as follows:
• Provable Privacy Guarantees in Single-user Settings: We
support rigorous local differential privacy guarantees for
protecting a single user’s mobile sensor data. Furthermore,
we propose a novel relaxed variant of local differential
privacy for providing inference control over the mobile
sensor data, which is the first such attempt to the best
of our knowledge. Our proposed privacy metric satisfies
composition properties, and can achieve improved utility
by focusing on protecting a specific set of inferences.
• Novel Perturbation Mechanisms for Enhanced Privacy-
Utility Tradeoffs: We propose an effective perturbation
mechanism which consists of two key techniques: (1) au-
toencoder based data minimization and (2) feature obfus-
cation based data perturbation. Our first technique auto-
matically extracts features relevant to the useful/authorized
inferences by extending the autoencoder models for dimen-
sionality reduction, which to our best knowledge is the first
such attempt. For the second technique, we propose effective
feature perturbation methods, that achieve both conventional
and relaxed notions of local differential privacy guarantees.
Through rigorous theoretical analysis, we demonstrate the
advantage of our approach over the state-of-the-art obfus-
cation mechanisms.
• Implementation and Evaluation: We implement our system
using real-world datasets and mobile apps (for all the case
studies discussed previously). For our first feature learning
step, we demonstrate that our modified autoencoder net-
work outperforms the state-of-the-art feature extraction ap-
proaches such as discrete Fourier transform (DFT), discrete
cosine transform (DCT), wavelet transformation, principal
component analysis (PCA) and blind compressive sensing
(BCS), with up to 2x improvement. For our end-to-end
approach combining both feature extraction and perturba-
tion, we demonstrate the advantage of our technique over
the state-of-the-art obfuscation mechanisms with up to 8x
improvement. Furthermore, we will make our DEEProtect
framework publicly available.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Android-based SPPMs
MockDroid [7] is a modified version of the Android op-
erating system (OS) with ability to ‘mock’ a given resource
requested by an app. This approach allows users to revoke
access to particular resources at run-time, encouraging users
to consider the trade-off between functionality and privacy.
AppFence [39] offers two approaches for protecting sensitive
data from untrusted apps: shadowing and blocking sensitive
data from being exfiltrated off the device. IdentiDroid [79]
is also a customized Android OS providing different identifi-
cations and privileges, to limit the uniqueness of device and
user information. The above systems still rely on the user to
determine the sensitive sensors and block, mock, or shadow
them. ipShield [15], provides users the ability to specify their
privacy preferences in terms of inferences, however, they
only generate binary privacy policies of allow and deny for
individual sensors. Such binary access control over the sensor
data may seriously affect the functionality of various apps.
DEEProtect on the other hand provides the much needed
automatic translation from higher-level privacy specifications
in terms of inferences to obfuscation of sensor data.
Another important limitation of the state-of-the-art SPPMs
is that they are often heuristic in nature and fail to provide
rigorous privacy guarantees for inference control over mobile
sensors [15], [92], [81], [69], [70]. For instance, ipShield [15]
does provide users with ability to configure obfuscation poli-
cies for sensors (through addition of random noise), but
does not quantify any privacy guarantees for those policies.
Boxify [4] provides app sandboxing for untrusted apps in
an isolated environment with minimum access privileges.
EaseDroid [89] uses semi-supervised learning to perform
automatic policy analysis and refinement. This could be used
to compliment DEEProtect by automatically learning the set
of inferences that need to be protected and ones that need to
be released from access patterns and audit logs.
Suman et al. in [41], [42] presented novel approaches to add
a privacy-protection layer to mobile systems where untrusted
applications have access to camera resources. These methods
primarily aim to limit the information contained in an image
before sharing, and could potentially be used in conjunction
with our DEEProtect – e.g., the analysis of DEEProtect could
inform transformations applied by Suman et al.
Privacy-preserving mobile data aggregation has been studied
in [49], [21], [19]. These approaches assume the presence
of a multi-user database and aim to protect the privacy of
the multi-user training data. However, DEEProtect aims to
protect a single user’s data while using his/her mobile device.
The training process in DEEProtect is implemented offline
and only the trained models/parameters are transferred to
the mobile device. Therefore, a privacy-preserving training
process in [49], [21], [19] is orthogonal to our scenario.
B. Repository of Inferences
We surveyed more than 70 research papers published in
relevant conferences and journals over the past 6 years to form
a knowledge repository of inferences (as shown in Table I) in
the Appendix that can be made using a combination of sensors
accessed by mobile apps. In Table I, each row represents a
category of inference computed over mobile sensor data, along
with the specific sensors that are utilized and the corresponding
research papers. This table forms the universe of possible
inferences over which the set of useful and sensitive inferences
in DEEProtect are defined.
C. Summary of Our Novelty
To the best of our knowledge, DEEProtect is the first system
that provides a novel inference control in mobile sensing
applications. Furthermore, DEEProtect 1) uniquely provides
provable privacy guarantees including both conventional local
differential privacy and our relaxed variant of local differential
privacy for sensitive sensor data; 2) presents an effective
mechanism consisting of two key techniques: autoencoder
based data minimization and feature obfuscation based data
perturbation; 3) outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in
multiple mobile sensing datasets and applications.
III. THREAT MODEL AND SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we will discuss the threat model and the two
usage modes of our DEEProtect system. We will also provide
an overview of our approach.
A. Threat Model and Usage Modes
We assume that DEEProtect together with the underlying
mobile OS, sensors, and system services form the trusted
domain. Our adversary is an untrusted app provider, who
publishes apps in the marketplace for advertised useful in-
ferences. The app accesses sensors including ones to which
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Fig. 2. (a) Venn diagram for information measures associated with
user’s raw sensor data D (shown in white), useful inferences U(D)
(shown in green) and sensitive inferences S(D) (shown in red).
(b) DEEProtect pipeline comprises of a data minimization step for
learning a compact feature representation specific to authorized useful
inferences; a data obfuscation step to perturb features and provide
provable privacy guarantees; a data reconstruction step to generate
obfuscated sensor data from perturbed features.
the user has provided explicit permission, and also others
for which no permission is required. The app would then
send out the collected sensor data to the adversary. Our goal
is to ensure that the data shared with the app can only be
used for deriving the authorized (useful) inferences and not
any sensitive inferences. We therefore aim to limit/bound the
adversary’s inference of the user’s sensitive information by
mediating access to obfuscated sensor data provided by DEEP-
rotect while achieving rigorous privacy properties. Specifically,
DEEProtect supports two usage modes, depending on how
sensitive inferences are specified.
Usage Mode 1: Only the useful inference set U(D) is
provided and the sensitive inference set S(D) is the default
set of ‘all possible inferences’. Under this mode, the user is
interested in rigorous privacy guarantees with respect to the
entire set (possibly unknown) of inferences. DEEProtect under
usage mode 1 aim to provide rigorous local differential privacy
for mobile sensor data.
Usage Mode 2: Both the useful and the sensitive inference
sets are provided. Under this scenario, the user is interested in
protecting only a specific set of sensitive inferences (and not all
possible inferences). To provide provable privacy guarantees,
we develop a relaxed variant of local differential privacy and
use it to perturb the mobile sensor data.
It is also interesting to note that a threat model similar to
usage mode 2 (i.e., protecting against specified inferences)
has been explored in Pufferfish privacy [44] and Blowfish
privacy [35]. For example, the set of sensitive inferences
computed over sensor data in DEEProtect is the set of potential
secrets defined in Pufferfish and Blowfish privacy. Blowfish
privacy has recently been adopted by the U.S. Census Bureau
demonstrating the usefulness of this paradigm for enabling
practical deployment.
B. Approach Overview
We now illustrate the working of DEEProtect by using Case
Study 3 as an example. Figure 2(a) shows the venn diagram of
information measures in DEEProtect. To protect users’ privacy,
it is required that we should not directly share the raw sensor
data D with the untrusted third-party apps, where D is the
entire white square shown in Figure 2(a)–1. In Case Study
3, D corresponds to the microphone data. Our objective is to
enable U(D) (speech-to-text translation) with high accuracy
while protecting against S(D) (speaker identity recognition).
Intuition of Our Key Idea Using Case Study 3: The
key idea in DEEProtect is to first ignore the information that
is orthogonal to the useful inference information, since the
overall utility performance can not benefit from these orthog-
onal information. In this case, we only retain information that
enable U(D) and ignore the remaining information U c(D) =
D\U(D), which is shown in yellow in Figure 2(a)–2. In the
next step, we perturb those information that are correlated
to both the useful and sensitive inferences, U(D) ∩ S(D),
as shown in blue in Figure 2(a)–3. The underlying reason is
that these correlated features can help the adversary to infer
sensitive information of the users. This feature perturbation
step helps in selectively hindering the sensitive inferences
without severely degrading the useful inferences, while pro-
viding rigorous local differential privacy under usage mode 1
and relaxed location differential privacy under usage mode 2.
Description of Our Approach Using Case Study 3:
Intuitively, both the useful and sensitive inferences rely on a
limited number of features extracted from the sensor data. The
commonly used features for speech-to-text translation are Mel-
frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC), spectrogram and N-
gram [48], [61], [93], while the popular features for speaker
identity recognition are MFCC, spectrogram and voice biomet-
rics of the user (such as her pitch, accent, etc.) [52], [66]. The
first challenge for DEEProtect is to learn the set of features
associated with the useful/authorized inferences. To mitigate
this problem, DEEProtect modifies autoencoder models [37],
[46], [88] by explicitly incorporating the useful inferences to
automatically learn the appropriate set of features pertaining to
the useful inferences. This implies that we only retain MFCC,
spectrogram and N-gram features that are required for speech-
to-text translation1. In the next step, we perturb the MFCC and
spectrogram features, which are required for both speech-to-
text translation and speaker identity recognition. Finally, we
reconstruct the privacy-preserving microphone data from the
perturbed MFCC and spectrogram, and the unperturbed N-
gram before sharing with the third-party apps.
Approach Overview for Arbitrary Inferences: For ar-
bitrary useful and sensitive inferences, the three-stage data
obfuscation pipeline used in DEEProtect is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2(b). In the first stage, we extract features from raw sensor
data and perform data minimization [40], [71], [14] to guaran-
tee that only features that are relevant to the authorized (useful)
inferences are retained for further processing. Specifically,
DEEProtect modifies an autoencoder network [37], [46], [88]
to automatically explore the inherent structural characteristics
of the sensor data, and learn a sparse feature representation
of the data specific to the useful inferences. At this point,
some of the extracted features, although highly specific to
the useful inferences, might still have some correlation with
the sensitive inferences. In the next step of the pipeline, we
1Note, these automatically learned features can not be interpreted in the
same way as MFCC, spectrogram, N-gram, etc. For ease of explanation, we
continue to name them as MFCC, spectrogram, N-gram, etc.
develop a computationally efficient mechanism that perturbs
the sparse features, using either the conventional local dif-
ferential privacy framework [23], [30], [73] or our relaxed
notion of local differential privacy framework, depending on
the specification of sensitive inferences. Finally, we reconstruct
the obfuscated sensor data from the perturbed features such
that the existing interfaces for mobile apps can continue to
work without any change. Specifically, we adapt the popular
Laplace perturbation mechanism [24] to construct effective
perturbation approaches, in order to provide both conventional
and relaxed notions of local differential privacy guarantees for
protecting mobile sensor data. Our theoretical analysis and
experimental results on real-world datasets show that both
usage modes of our approach significantly outperform previous
state-of-the-art with up to 8x improvement.
IV. PRIVACY METRICS FOR PROTECTING MOBILE SENSOR
DATA IN SINGLE-USER SETTINGS
To provide provable privacy guarantees for a single user’s
mobile sensor stream, we exploit local differential privacy to
protect against all sensitive inferences (corresponding to usage
mode 1 in Section III-A). We also propose a relaxed variant
of local differential privacy to protect against a specific set
of sensitive inferences (corresponding to usage mode 2 in
Section III-A). We further demonstrate the privacy properties
of our new privacy metric.
A. Local Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) [24], [27], [25], [29], [26] is a
rigorous mathematical framework that prevents an attacker
from inferring the presence or absence of a particular record
in a statistical database. DP randomizes the query results,
computed over the multi-user database, to ensure that the risk
to an individual record’s privacy does not increase substantially
(bounded by a function of the privacy budget ) as a result
of participating in the database. Local differential privacy
(LDP) [23], [30], [73], as an adaptation of DP, is defined
under the setting where the user does not trust anyone (not
even the central data collector). Local privacy dates back to
Warner [90], who proposed the randomized response method
to provide plausible deniability for individuals responding to
sensitive surveys. In our setting, we therefore apply LDP to
protect a single user’s mobile sensor data while satisfying
rigorous privacy guarantees. Similar applications have also
been explored in Google’s Rappor System [30]. Specifically,
-LDP is defined as follows:
Definition 1: (-LDP) [23] A randomized algorithm A(·)
provides -LDP if for any two databases D1, D2 and any
output set o,
max
D1,D2,o
P(A(D1) = o)
P(A(D2) = o)
≤ exp() (1)
where A(D1) (resp.A(D2)) is the output of A(·) on input
D1 (resp.D2) and  is the privacy budget. Smaller value of 
corresponds to a higher privacy level.
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Fig. 3. Our collected mobile sensor data (segmented with a time
window size Nw = 10).
Applying LDP to Mobile Sensor Data: For a mobile
sensing system, consisting of Ns sensors across T timestamps,
the temporal mobile sensor matrix TMS ∈ RNs×T is a real
matrix where TMS(i, j) records the sensing data of the i-th
sensor at the j-th timestamp. To fully explore the temporal
characteristics of the data, we follow common practice [31],
[47], [56] and partition it into a series of segments according
to a time window size Nw 2as shown in Figure 3. For the
w-th window, we stack the corresponding columns within it
to form a column vector which is denoted by xt ∈ RNsNw×1.
The temporal mobile sensor matrix can thus be reformulated
as X = [x1;x2; · · · ], where X ∈ RNsNw× TNw . We therefore
apply LDP to a single user’s mobile sensor data which is
segmented according to a window size. In this way, we can
take the temporal dynamics of users’ mobile sensor data into
consideration, while providing rigorous privacy guarantees.
From Definition 1, we observe that -LDP has the same
mathematical formulation as -DP, except that the neighboring
databases in LDP are any two possible databases without the
constraint of one tuple’s difference as in DP [24]. Thus, when
applying LDP to mobile sensing applications, the neighboring
databases represent any two segmented sensor data that differ
in any possible sensor recording at any timestamp within
the same window. A mechanism that provides rigorous LDP
can defend against any inference attacks over the obfuscated
data, according to the post-processing invariant property [28].
Therefore, we can provide rigorous LDP for users’ sensor
data to defend against all possible inferences over the data
(corresponding to usage mode 1 in Section III-A).
B. Relaxed Local Differential Privacy
The need for a relaxed variant: Although we can provide
rigorous LDP and defend against all inferences computed over
the obfuscated sensor data (usage mode 1), in practice, a
user may aim to defend against a specific subset of sensitive
inferences instead of focusing on all possible inferences. For
instance, Blowfish privacy [35] has recently been deployed by
the US Census for protecting specific sensitive information.
Therefore, we further consider a scenario where the user aims
to defend against a specific subset of sensitive inferences over
the sensor data (usage mode 2). Under this threat model, there
are novel opportunities to strategically add noise and enhance
utility. We thus relax the definition of LDP to provide provable
2We set window size as an input to our system.
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Fig. 4. Relaxed neighboring databases according to Definition 2,
which have different sensitive inference values whilst the same values
for the orthogonal inferences.
privacy guarantees for a specific subset of sensitive inferences
but significantly improve the utility performance.
Pufferfish [44] and Blowfish [35] privacy frameworks have
similarly motivated the threat model of protecting against
a specific set of sensitive computations over the data. In-
spired by these frameworks and Definition 1, we define our
relaxed neighboring databases as follows. The advantage of
our formulation is that we provide a computationally efficient
mechanism to achieve this rigorous privacy guarantee while
the same is not true for Pufferfish privacy.
Definition 2: Let us represent a set of sensitive inferences as
S(·) which map the temporal sensor data to their correspond-
ing inference results (i.e., labels), which is the information we
want to protect. Let us represent an orthogonal function of S(·)
as K(·). Thus, ∫
x
K(x)×S(x)dx = 0, where K(·) ∈ S⊥ and
S⊥ is the orthogonal component of S(·) consisting of all the
functions that are orthogonal to S(·). Two databases D1, D2
are relaxed neighboring databases, iff. S(D1) 6= S(D2),
K(D1) = K(D2) for any function K(·).
We illustrate the relaxed neighboring databases above in
Figure 4. For concrete interpretation of the definition, we refer
back to Case Study 3 in Section I, where the useful inference is
speech-to-text translation and the sensitive inference is speaker
identity recognition. Intuitively, both the useful and sensitive
inferences rely on a limited number of features extracted from
the sensor data. The commonly used features for speech-
to-text translation are Mel-frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFCC), spectrogram and N-gram [48], [61], [93], while the
popular features for speaker identity recognition are MFCC,
spectrogram and the voice biometrics of the user (such as her
pitch, accent, etc.) [52], [66]. According to Definition 2, the
relaxed neighboring databases there refer to two sensor data
streams that correspond to different speakers (i.e., different
values of MFCC, spectrogram and the voice biometrics) and
have the same values of N-gram (the orthogonal component).
Therefore, the relaxed neighboring databases in Definition 2
focuses on protecting the privacy of sensitive inferences only
(whose values differ in the two databases), and not the
component of the data that is orthogonal to sensitive inferences
(whose values remain the same in the two databases).
Remark on orthogonal functions: We further illustrate the
relaxed neighboring databases in a three-dimensional space
(our definition can be generally applied to any space) in
Figure 5, where there are two functions K1(·),K2(·) that
are orthogonal with the sensitive inference function S(·), i.e.,∫
x
K1(x)× S(x)dx = 0,
∫
x
K2(x)× S(x)dx = 0. According
to Definition 2, we have the following properties for the two
relaxed neighboring databases D1, D2: 1) they have the same
Fig. 5. Illustration of the two relaxed neighboring databases D1, D2
in Definition 2. K1(·),K2(·) are orthogonal functions of the sensitive
inference function S(·).
projection on the direction corresponding to the orthogonal
functions, i.e., K1(D1) = K1(D2),K2(D1) = K2(D2); 2)
they have different projection on the direction corresponding
to the sensitive inference function, i.e., S(D1) 6= S(D2).
Inspired by the relaxed neighboring databases in Defini-
tion 2, we now formulate a relaxed variant of local differential
privacy (RLDP) which is also an instantiation of the Pufferfish
and Blowfish privacy frameworks. In fact, we can observe that
our set of sensitive inferences computed over sensor data is the
set of potential secrets defined in Pufferfish privacy (Definition
3.4 in [44]) and Blowfish privacy (Definition 4.2 in [35]).
Definition 3: (-RLDP) For a set of sensitive inference
functions S(·) and a privacy budget , a randomized algorithm
A(·) satisfies -RLDP for protecting S(·), if for any two
relaxed neighboring databases D1, D2 defined in Definition 2
and any output set o,
max
D1,D2,o
P(A(D1) = o)
P(A(D2) = o)
≤ exp() (2)
Smaller values of  correspond to higher privacy level.
To achieve -RLDP for protecting sensitive information, it is
required that the shared data o = A(D1) = A(D2) conditioned
on any two different sensitive information S(D1), S(D2)
(where S(D1) 6= S(D2) in Definition 2), is statistically
indistinguishable from each other. This in turn guarantees
that an adversary gains negligible information about the true
sensitive information upon observing the shared data. We re-
iterate that unlike traditional LDP frameworks, its relaxed
variant focuses only on the privacy of a specific subset of
sensitive inferences. A perturbation mechanism developed to
satisfy RLDP guarantees would thus result in better utility
performance than the LDP mechanisms.
By extending the previous results on composition properties
for LDP in [23], our RLDP also composes securely, i.e., retains
privacy guarantees even in the presence of multiple releases.
Furthermore, our RLDP is also immune to post processing.
Therefore, a data analyst, cannot increase privacy loss of the
data by computing a function of the output of a RLDP-private
algorithm. The detailed proofs for these privacy properties are
deferred to the appendix to improve readability.
Theorem 1: (Sequential Composition Theorem) Let ran-
domized algorithm At(D) (t = 1, 2, · · · ) each provide t-
RLDP under the sensitive inference functions S(·). The se-
quence of these algorithms At(D) provides
∑
t
t-RLDP.
Theorem 2: (Parallel Composition Theorem) Let random-
ized algorithms At(Dt) (t = 1, 2, · · · ) provide t-RLDP under
the sensitive inference functions S(·) and Dt be arbitrary
disjoint data set. The sequence of these randomized algorithm
At(Dt) provides max
t
t-RLDP.
Theorem 3: (Post-processing Invariant Property) Let ran-
domized algorithm A(D) provide -RLDP under the sensitive
inference functions S(·). Let f be an arbitrary mapping
computed over A(D). Then, f(A(D)) provides -RLDP.
It is worth noting that our proposed RLDP is of independent
interest even outside of its application to mobile systems.
V. PERTURBATION MECHANISMS
In this section, we design effective perturbation mechanisms
to achieve -LDP and -RLDP (corresponding to the two usage
modes in Section III-A) for protecting mobile sensor data in a
single-user setting. Our key insight is to exploit the structural
characteristics of mobile sensor data to enhance privacy-utility
tradeoffs. Before proposing our privacy mechanisms, we first
introduce a baseline approach which directly generalizes the
traditional DP perturbation mechanisms to achieve -LDP.
A. Baseline Approach
To achieve -DP, the Laplace Perturbation Mechanism
(LPM) [24] applies noise drawn from a suitable Laplace
distribution to perturb the query results. More formally, for
a query function Q(·), LPM computes and outputs A(D) =
Q(D) + Lap(λ), where λ = ∆Q/ is the parameter of the
Laplacian noise and ∆Q = maxD1,D2 ‖Q(D1)−Q(D2)‖1 is
the global sensitivity of Q(·) [24].
When applying LDP (recall Definition 1) on mobile sensor
data xt, the neighboring databases xt1,xt2 may differ in
all their possible tuples (i.e., all sensor recordings across all
timestamps within the same window), while the neighboring
databases in traditional DP frameworks only differ in one
tuple. According to the composition theorem of DP [60], we
propose a baseline approach to achieve -LDP, which inserts
a Laplacian noise to each temporal sensor data point with
the same parameter of λ = dim(xt)∆Q/ 3, where dim(xt)
is the dimension of each segmented sensor data xt (we refer
interested readers to [17] for similar perturbation mechanisms).
The baseline approach thus achieves -LDP guarantees.
B. DEEProtect Perturbation Mechanisms for Enhanced
Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs
Note that the baseline approach introduces noise that is
linear in the number of temporal sensor recordings within
the time window. This increases the magnitude of noise that
needs to be added and thus degrades the usability of the data.
Therefore, a better alternative to protect sensor data is to
build a compact, privacy-preserving synopsis from the data
by exploiting its structural characteristics.
Data minimization [40], [71], [14] is a fundamental legal
instrument that protects privacy by limiting the collection of
3Note that the sensitivity ∆Q is estimated from our collected data serving
as a local sensitivity.
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personal data to the minimum extent necessary for attaining
legitimate goals. In our work, we enforce the principle of
data minimization and retain only the minimum number of
features necessary to enable the authorized inferences. Specif-
ically, we propose a novel supervised autoencoder model to
extract authorized features that are only relevant to the useful
inferences. These extracted features may still be correlated
with the sensitive inferences; thus we incorporate LDP/RLDP
guarantees to obfuscate these features for protecting against
sensitive inferences. In this section, we propose DEEProtect
(recall Figure 2(b)) which consists of two key steps of 1) first
extracting features based on the data minimization principle
and 2) then perturbing these features to achieve both conven-
tional and relaxed notions of LDP guarantees.
1) Autoencoder based Data Minimization: Mobile sensor
data is usually high-dimensional in nature, which typically
exhibits both structure and redundancy, allowing minimiza-
tion [50], [6]. This lays the foundation for the first technique in
our DEEProtect system: autoencoder based data minimization.
Existing Autoencoder Models: Autoencoders [37], [46] au-
tomatically extract features in an unsupervised manner by
minimizing the reconstruction error between the input and
its reconstructed output. Multi-layer autoencoders learn trans-
formations from the input data to the output representations,
which is more powerful for feature extraction than hand-
crafted shallow models. A single-layer autoencoder is shown
in Figure 6. The encoder function Enc(·) maps the input data
xt to the hidden units (features) according to ft = Enc(xt) =
genc(Wxt + be), where g(·) is typically a sigmoid function,
W is a weight matrix and be is a bias vector. The decoder
function Dec(·) maps these features back to the original input
space according to x˜t = Dec(ft) = gdec(W ′ft + bd), where
gdec(·) is usually the same form as that in the encoder, W ′ is
a weight matrix and bd a bias vector. Considering the inherent
structure of the mobile sensor data [50], [6], we aim to learn
an effective feature space on which the mobile sensor data
would have a succinct representation, and the corresponding
objective function is as follows.
J0(W , be, bd,W
′) =
∑T/Nw
t=1
Re error(xt, Dec(Enc(xt)))
(3)
where Re error(xt, Dec(Enc(xt))) is the reconstruction er-
ror between the input data xt and its reconstructed output
Dec(Enc(xt)). Existing autoencoders thus aim to minimize
J0(W , be, bd,W
′) with respect to W , be, bd,W ′ [37], [46].
Our New Approach for Data Minimization: Using a nonlin-
ear encoding function an autoencoder can typically extract bet-
ter features than previous linear transformation methods [87].
But, the features learnt are not specific to the useful inferences.
To handle this, we explicitly modify the autoencoder models
in Eq. 3 by incorporating the useful inferences and other
associated constraints as follows. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work to modify the autoencoder models through
incorporating the authorized inferences.
Incorporating Useful Inferences: The objective for our data
minimization mechanism is to maximize utility performance
with the minimum amount of information, therefore it is
important to combine the useful inferences with autoencoder
models to automatically extract features in a supervised man-
ner. Specifically, we incorporate the minimization of cost
function corresponding to useful inferences to the objective
function of existing autoencoders in Eq. 3.
We analyze the cost function for each inference using Case
Study 1 in Section I, where behavior-based authentication was
considered as a useful inference and activity mode detection
was deemed sensitive. We emphasize that our autoencoder
model only requires knowledge of the useful and not the
sensitive inferences – a requirement exactly similar to tradi-
tional DP. The useful inferences can be mathematically trans-
formed into classification problems, which can be addressed
by machine learning techniques. For instance, by leveraging
the popular ridge regression technique [38], we can learn an
optimal classifier as follows.
c∗U = arg min
c
CU = arg min
c
β‖c‖2 +
∑T/Nw
t=1
(cTxt − yUt )2
(4)
where C∗U represents the cost function for the useful infer-
ence. For behavior-based authentication (useful inference in
Case Study 1), the label yUt ∈ {1,−1} where 1 represents
the legitimate user and −1 represents the adversary4. The
optimal classifier c∗U learned in Eq. 4 can be utilized to
label the newly-coming mobile sensor data for behavior-based
authentication. The cost function in Eq. 4 has been popularly
used in machine learning community whilst other general
models in [85], [8], [37] can also be explored as potential
cost function of these inferences. Note that our analysis are
not restricted to these settings and can be utilized for arbitrary
inference-based mobile applications.
Incorporating Orthogonality: In addition, we also aim to
learn orthogonal features so that we can deal with each
feature independently in our feature perturbation mechanism
for achieving enhanced utility performance. Therefore, we add
another constraint as WW T = I to the objective function to
guarantee the orthogonality of the features (similar intuition
has also been utilized in [84]).
Our New Autoencoder Model: Incorporating useful infer-
ences and orthogonality into Eq. 3 and combining with Eq. 4,
we construct the objective function for our data minimization
4Note that such labels are only needed for the training process and are not
required when a normal user utilizes our DEEProtect system.
Algorithm 1 Autoencoder based Data Minimization
Input: The sensor data {xt}T/Nwt=1 , the learning rate α;
Output: Weight matrix W ,W ′ and bias be, bd;
1. Initialize W , be, bd, c randomly and set W ′ = W T ;
2. For each iteration = 1, 2, 3 · · · do
3. Set ∆W = 0,∆be = 0,∆bd = 0,∆c = 0;
4. Compute the partial derivatives:
∆W =
∂J(W , be, bd,W
′, c)
∂W
, ∆be =
∂J(W , be, bd,W
′, c)
∂be
∆bd =
∂J(W , be, bd,W
′, c)
∂bd
, ∆c =
∂J(W , be, bd,W
′, c)
∂c
(6)
5. Update W , be, bd, c by gradient descent as
W := W − α∆W , be := be − α∆be
bd := bd − α∆bd, c := c− α∆c (7)
6. Orthogonalize the weight matrix as
W := (WW T )−
1
2W (8)
method as
min J(W , be, bd,W
′, c) = min J0(W , be, bd,W ′)
+ µβ‖c‖2 + µ
∑T/Nw
t=1
(cT (Dec(Enc(xt))− yUt )2
s.t. WW T = I
(5)
where µ controls the trade-off between the reconstruction
loss and the utility penalty, and WW T = I represents the
orthogonality constraint. Note that the last two terms in Eq. 5
correspond to the cost function in ridge regression in Eq. 4.
Although we only consider the cost function of ridge regres-
sion to optimize the data minimization process, our algorithm
can be generalized to multiple machine learning techniques
such as support vector machine [82], naive Bayesian [77] and
random forests [11] in a straightforward manner.
Model Learning and Stacking: To minimize
J(W , be, bd,W
′, c) in Eq. 5 with respect to
W , be, bd,W
′, c, we explore the stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) technique, which has been shown to perform fairly
well in practice [10]. Furthermore, we explore multiple hidden
layers to stack multiple model units, in order to generate even
more compact and higher-level semantic features resulting in
better data minimization. To improve readability, we defer
all the details about model learning and stacking into the
appendix, based on which we summarize our autoencoder
based data minimization mechanism in Algorithm 1.
2) Perturbation Mechanism for Usage Mode 1 (Achieving
-LDP): LDP considers the worst-case adversary which can
rigorously protect against all possible inferences computed
over the data (recall Definition 1). In the absence of system-
specified set of sensitive inferences, or otherwise if the user
chooses to operate under the LDP guarantees (usage mode 1 in
DEEProtect), we develop our perturbation mechanism through
perturbing the features learnt from the autoencoder based data
minimization step in Section V-B1. Formally, to achieve -
LDP, DEEProtect under usage mode 1 inserts an Laplacian
Algorithm 2 DEEProtect under Usage Mode 1.
Input: Original Sensor Data {xt}T/Nwt=1 ; Useful Inference Sets
U(·); Privacy Budget ;
Output: Perturbed Sensor Data {x′t}T/Nwt=1 ;
For each t = 1, 2, · · · , T/Nw
1. extract features ft from xt by data minimization
mechanism in Algorithm 1;
2. obtain perturbed features f ′t by inserting noise of
Lap(
√
dim(ft) dim(xt)∆Q/);
3. reconstruct perturbed sensor data x′t = Dec(f
′
t);
noise with parameter λ =
√
dim(ft) dim(xt)∆Q/ to each
previously learned feature, where dim(xt),dim(ft) represent
the dimension of the segmented sensor data xt and the features
ft extracted from xt, respectively.5 DEEProtect mechanism
under usage mode 1 is summarized in Algorithm 2, which
satisfies rigorous -LDP as will be discussed in Theorem 4.
Our mechanism is different from the baseline approach
in Section V-A because we add Laplacian noise after the
application of the autoencoder based data minimization step,
while the baseline approach directly adds Laplacian noise to
the raw sensor data without the autoencoder mechanism. After
perturbing these features, we reconstruct the perturbed sensor
data according to the decoder function Dec(·) in autoencoder
(recall Eq. 3). We will show that our mechanism significantly
outperforms the baseline approach (in Sections VI, VIII). Note
that our privacy objective is also different from that in [80],
[2] since they aim to protect each user’s training data in the
autoencoder training stage under the multi-user settings while
in contrast we aim to protect the privacy of mobile sensor data
stream in single-user settings.
3) Perturbation Mechanism for Usage Mode 2 (Achiev-
ing -RLDP): If the system configuration has specified a
subset of sensitive inferences (usage mode 2 in DEEPro-
tect), we develop our perturbation mechanism (summarized
in Algorithm 3) by first computing the relaxed sensitivity
∆Qrelax, and then inserting an Laplacian noise with parameter
λrelax =
√
dim(ft) dim(xt)∆Qrelax/ to each previously
learned feature, to satisfy -RLDP. The detailed process to
compute the relaxed sensitivity is as follows.
Computing Relaxed Sensitivity: Similar to sensitivity in
DP [24], our relaxed sensitivity can be computed as
∆Qrelax = max
xt1,xt2
‖Q(xt1)−Q(xt2)‖1/dim(xt) (9)
where xt1,xt2 are relaxed neighboring databases in Defini-
tion 2, and the denominator is set to make relaxed sensitivity
comparable with traditional sensitivity computed over neigh-
boring databases that differ in only one tuple.
The sensitive inferences can be mathematically transformed
into a classification problem, which can be addressed by
5Although the noise parameter is higher than the baseline approach with
a factor of
√
dim(ft), the number of features, i.e., dim(ft), needed to
be perturbed is much smaller than the number of raw sampling points, i.e.,
dim(xt), in the baseline approach.
Algorithm 3 DEEProtect under Usage Mode 2.
Input: Original Sensor Data {xt}T/Nwt=1 ; Useful and Sensitive
Inference Sets U(·), S(·); Privacy Budget ;
Output: Perturbed Sensor Data {x′t}T/Nwt=1 ;
For each t = 1, 2, · · · , T/Nw
1. extract features ft from xt by data minimization
mechanism in Algorithm 1;
2. compute relaxed sensitivity ∆Qrelax in Eq. 9;
3. obtain perturbed features f ′t by inserting noise of
Lap(
√
dim(ft) dim(xt)∆Qrelax/);
4. reconstruct perturbed sensor data x′t = Dec(f
′
t);
machine learning techniques. Specifically, we can also infer the
sensitive inference classifier as the ridge regression classifier
in Eq. 4, by utilizing the labeled training data corresponding to
the sensitive inference function. Let us take the activity mode
detection (sensitive inference in Case Study 1) as an example.
The corresponding labels ySt for the mobile sensor data xt
satisfy ySt ∈ {1, 2, 3} where 1, 2 and 3 represent walking,
standing still and moving up or down the stairs, respectively.
The ridge regression classifier c∗S for the sensitive inference
is thus a linear function computed over the segmented sensor
data xt, i.e., S(xt) = xtT ·c∗S . We explain the computation of
relaxed sensitivity using this formulation, though our analysis
can be generally applied to non-linear situations using kernel-
based techniques [20]. We apply the Gram-Schmidt orthog-
onalization technique [9] to a matrix [c∗S ; I] (where I is
an identity matrix and thus [c∗S ; I] is full-rank), in order to
obtain orthogonal vectors of c∗S as c∗S⊥1, c
∗S
⊥2, · · · . Based on
that, we form an orthogonal matrix S = [c∗S ; c∗S⊥1; c
∗S
⊥2; · · · ].
Any function K(·) that is orthogonal of the sensitive inference
function S(·) (recall Definition 2) can be represented by a
linear combination of c∗S⊥1, c
∗S
⊥2, · · · .
For the two relaxed neighboring databases xt1,xt2, we have
xTt1 · c∗S⊥1 = xTt2 · c∗S⊥1,xTt1 · c∗S⊥2 = xTt2 · c∗S⊥2, · · · , according
to Definition 2. Therefore, we know that S · (xt1 − xt2) =
S ·xt1−S ·xt2 = [xTt1 ·c∗S−xTt2 ·c∗S ,xTt1 ·c∗S⊥1−xTt2 ·c∗S⊥1,xTt1 ·
c∗S⊥2 − xTt2 · c∗S⊥2, · · · ]T = [γ, 0, 0, · · · ]T , i.e., xt1 − xt2 =
S−1·[γ, 0, 0, · · · ]T , and the value of γ is restricted by the range
of xt. Since we consider the identity query (as we publish the
sanitized sensor data to mobile apps), we obtain the constraint
of γ as ‖S−1 ·[γ, 0, 0, · · · ]T ‖1 = ‖xt1−xt2‖1 ≤ dim(xt)∆Q.
Therefore, we can compute the relaxed sensitivity as follows.
∆Qrelax = max
γ: ‖S−1·[γ,0,0,··· ]T ‖1≤dim(xt)∆Q
‖S−1 · [γ, 0, 0, · · · ]T ‖1
dim(xt)
(10)
It is worth noting that ∆Qrelax ≤ ∆Q due to the constraint
of relaxed neighboring databases for achieving the same
orthogonal inference values (recall Definition 2). Therefore,
comparing to usage mode 1, DEEProtect under usage mode
2 would add less noise to the features extracted in the data
minimization step thus achieving better utility.
Our perturbation mechanism in DEEProtect has broad ap-
plicability even outside of its application to mobile systems as
considered in this paper.
VI. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Next, we theoretically show that our DEEProtect mecha-
nisms satisfy rigorous privacy guarantees and achieve signifi-
cant utility advantage over the baseline approach. We refer the
interested readers to the appendix for proofs of our theorems.
A. Theoretical Privacy Analysis
Our perturbation mechanisms in Algorithms 2, 3 satisfy -
LDP, -RLDP respectively, according to theorems below.
Theorem 4: DEEProtect under usage mode 1 (corresponding
to Algorithm 2) satisfies -LDP.
Theorem 5: DEEProtect under usage mode 2 (corresponding
to Algorithm 3) satisfies -RLDP.
B. Theoretical Utility Analysis
For a perturbation algorithm A, let us denote Error(A) =
EA[‖A(D)−D‖1] as the expected error in the release of data
D, where EA[·] is the expectation taken over the randomness
of A. We quantify the utility advantage of DEEProtect over
the baseline approach in the following Theorems 6, 7 (corre-
sponding to the two usage modes).
Theorem 6: For DEEProtect under usage mode 1 (corre-
sponding to Algorithm 2), the expected error Error(A) is
lower than that of the baseline approach in Section V-A by a
factor of dim(xt)dim(ft) , where ft is the feature set extracted from
the segmented sensor data xt by using our autoencoder based
data minimization approach.
Theorem 7: For DEEProtect under usage mode 2 (corre-
sponding to Algorithm 3), the expected error Error(A) is
lower than that of the baseline approach in Section V-A by
a factor of dim(xt)dim(ft) ·
∆Q
∆Qrelax
, where ∆Q,∆Qrelax are the
sensitivity and the relaxed sensitivity corresponding to the
query function Q(·), respectively.
Therefore, we know that the utility advantage of our au-
toencoder based data minimization in Section V-B1 is dim(xt)dim(ft)
and of our relaxed variant of LDP in Section V-B3 is ∆Q∆Qrelax .
VII. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we describe our methodology for collecting
sensor data from mobile devices, and the experimental setup
(including system parameters) for evaluation.
A. Sensor Data Collection
In our experimentsm, we collected data using a Google
Nexus 5 (2.3GHz, Krait 400 processor, 16GB internal storage,
2GB RAM on Android 4.4) and a Moto360 smartwatch
(OMAP 3 processor, 4GB internal storage, 512MB RAM on
Android Wear OS). On the smartphone, data was captured
from the accelerometer, gyroscope, orientation, ambient light,
proximity, and microphone sensors. On the smartwatch, the
accelerometer and gyroscope sensors were recorded (recall
Figure 3). The sampling rate was fixed at 10 Hz. 20 par-
ticipants (15 males and 5 females) were invited to take our
smartphone and smartwatch for two weeks and use them as
they would use their personal devices in their daily lives6. We
followed the ethical norms and procedures of our anonymized
organization while conducting the user study.
To obtain the ground-truth information for performance
evaluation, we ask the users to record labels for both the useful
and sensitive inferences. Note that these ground-truth labels
are only needed for the training process, and are not required
for a normal user to utilize our DEEProtect system. The
labeled training data is grouped under two different categories:
identity-recognition data or mode-detection data. The identity-
recognition data is used for authentication (useful inference
in Case Study 1) and speaker identity recognition (sensitive
inference in Case Study 3). The labeled data is generated by
associating the identity of a user as label to a mobile device,
on first use. The mode-detection data correspond to labeled
user activities. The number of tasks each user performs is
determined by the specific experiment and the corresponding
data segments are then labeled as per the tasks. For activity
mode detection (sensitive inference in Case Study 1), a user
performs 3 tasks: walking, standing still, moving up/down
stairs. For transportation detection (useful inference in Case
Study 2), a user performs 3 tasks: walking, taking a train,
taking a car. For recognition of users’ entered text in the
keyboard (sensitive inference in Case Study 2), a user performs
36 tasks corresponding to entering the 10 digits and 26 letters,
respectively. For speech-to-text translation (useful inference in
Case Study 3), a user performs 36 tasks of enunciating 10
digits and 26 letters, respectively.
User Study Limitations: While the user study described
above enables DEEProtect’s validation using real-world data,
it does have a few limitations. First, we only collect 20 users’
data for 2 weeks. It is possible that a larger amount of data
from more users would further enhance the performance of
DEEProtect. Second, the ground-truth information acquired
from users (only needed in the training process) may still
cause bias in statistics in the utility of DEEProtect. Despite
these limitations, the experimental results from the user study
which will be presented in Section VIII verify the effectiveness
of DEEProtect system.
B. System Parameter Setup
In our experiments, we segment the temporal mobile sensor
data (discussed above) according to the parameter of time
window size Nw = 10. For the autoencoder based data
minimization step (in Section V-B1), we use 10-fold cross
validation to generate the training data and testing data, where
9/10 of our collected data is used as training data and the
remaining 1/10 is used as testing data. We repeated this
process for 1000 iterations and reported the averaged results.
In our experiments, we used stacked autoencoders (α = 0.1
in Algorithm 1) with two hidden layers7 comprising of 15
and 7 units respectively. We will show that an autoencoder
6Note that our DEEProtect is not restricted to the usage of these devices
and can be generally applied to many real world scenarios.
7The two hidden layers are most commonly used in existing autoencoder
research.
with only two-hidden layers was able to extract better features
than the state-of-the-art techniques. The reduced number of
layers (and units) in the autoencoder allowed us to train the
model using small amount (2 weeks) of labeled data from the
user (note that we are protecting the sensitive inferences for a
single user). Note that the training itself is implemented offline
and only the trained models/parameters are transferred to the
phone. Thus, a privacy-preserving training process in [49],
[21], [19] is orthogonal to our method. We implemented all the
three case studies (tradeoff between authentication and activity
recognition, tradeoff between transportation detection and text
recognition, tradeoff between speech translation and speaker
identification) discussed in Section I on our real-world dataset
using the system parameters discussed above.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally demonstrate the effective-
ness of DEEProtect using multiple real-world datasets. We first
show the advantage of autoencoder-based data minimization
over existing feature extraction approaches with up to 2x
improvement. Next, we show the advantage of our end-to-end
methods combining both feature extraction and perturbation
over the baseline approach with up to 8x improvement.
A. Evaluation for Autoencoder-Based Data Minimization
We experimentally evaluate our autoencoder based data
minimization mechanism in Section V-B1, using the dataset
collected for Case Study 1 (recall Section I), where the useful
inference is the behavior-based authentication. To show the
advantage of our method, we further compare it with the state-
of-the-art feature extraction approaches. The discrete Fourier
transform (DFT) and discrete cosine transform (DCT) are
two basic transformation techniques in the signal processing
community, and the Haar basis forms the fundamental wavelet
transformation for time-frequency signal analysis. The prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA) technique [84] can also be
utilized to reveal hidden structure in mobile sensor data. Fur-
thermore, we also consider blind compressive sensing (BCS)
as a typical dictionary learning method for comparison [32].
Higher Accuracy: Figure 7 shows the utility-preserving per-
formance under different feature extraction methods. Note
that y-axis is the accuracy for behavior-based authentication
in Case Study 1 representing the ratio of correctly authenti-
cated users. Note that we use three-dimensional accelerometer
measurement for behavior-based authentication and set the
window size as Nw = 10 (recall Section VII-B), therefore
the dimension of each segmented sensor data is 3× 10.
From Figure 7, we can see that 1) more features would
be beneficial for improving the utility performance since the
combination of multiple features would be more accurate and
expressive to represent the input data; 2) our method achieves
higher accuracy than the state-of-the-art approaches with up
to 2x improvement. For example, when using 7 features, our
method can provide authentication accuracy of 86.13% while
the accuracy for previous approaches is lower than 41.02%,
which also validates the effectiveness of the ridge regression
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Fig. 7. The accuracy for behavior-based authentication in Case Study
1 after data minimization shows the advantage of our method over
previous approaches.
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Fig. 8. Informativeness [31] for the features learned from data
minimization. Our method produces better features with higher
informativeness than the state-of-the-art approaches.
classifier explored in our autoencoder-based data minimization
model (recall Eq. 5); 3) our data minimization mechanism
significantly benefits from the automatic learning process
which explicitly incorporates the useful inference information
into autoencoder models.
Based on our analysis above, we constrain the dimension of
features extracted by our autoencoder based data minimization
method to 7, whose corresponding accuracy is higher than 97%
(86.13%/88.39%) of the accuracy achieved by using all the
30 features (with 88.39% accuracy). Therefore, we represent
each of the 30-dimensional input sensor data xt with a feature
set ft consisting of only 7 features.
Higher Informativeness: We further leverage informativeness
in [31] as an important metric to evaluate the information-
theoretic relationship between each individual feature and the
useful inference information. The Informativeness Info(fi) of
the i-th feature fi, measures the relative mutual information
between the feature and the label of the utility function yU ,
and is computed as Info(fi) =
I(fi;y
U )
H(yU )
= 1 − H(yU |fi)
H(yU )
8.
Under the setting of Case Study 1, yU = 1,−1 represents
the legitimate user and the adversary, respectively. H(yU ) is
the entropy of the variable yU and I(fi; yU ) is the mutual
information between the random variables of fi and yU . For
each feature fi, this measure of informativeness takes a value
between 0 and 1, where 0 means that the feature contains no
information about the utility label yU and 1 means that the
feature can completely determine the utility label yU .
Recall that we set the dimension of features extracted by
our method to 7 (see Figure 7). We further evaluate their
corresponding informativeness in Figure 8. We can observe
that the features learned by our method have much higher in-
formativeness with up to 2x improvement over previous works.
8fi is the random variable taking the i-th value in each ft.
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Fig. 9. Utility performance with varying privacy budget  for dif-
ferent methods, where DEEProtect 1 and DEEProtect 2 represent
perturbation mechanism under usage mode 1 (Algorithm 2) and usage
mode 2 (Algorithm 3), respectively. A larger privacy budget  (less
perturbation) results in higher accuracy. Furthermore, compared to
the baseline approach our perturbation mechanism offers a different
tradeoff point which allows 8x improvement in utility. The range
for the 95% confidence interval of our accuracy results is less than
4.83%, providing additional validation of our results.
Therefore, our proposed method captures more expressive,
higher-quality features than the state-of-the-art approaches.
B. Evaluation for DEEProtect End-to-end Mechanisms
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our end-to-end pertur-
bation mechanisms combining both feature extraction and per-
turbation, we again consider Case Study 1 in Section I where
the behavior-based authentication is the useful inference and
the activity mode detection is the sensitive inference. We first
compare the baseline method with our mechanism under usage
mode 1 as shown in Algorithm 2, since they achieve the same
level of privacy guarantees for preventing all possible sensitive
inferences. Then, we compare the baseline method with our
mechanism under usage mode 2 as shown in Algorithm 3, to
verify the effectiveness of our RLDP for protecting a specific
subset of sensitive inferences.
Utility Advantage under Both Usage Modes: Figure 9 shows
the utility performance computed over the obfuscated sensor
data generated by DEEProtect. We can make the following
important observations using Figure 9: 1) DEEProtect achieves
considerable advantage over the baseline approach with up to
8x improvement in utility. This validates the effectiveness of
DEEProtect that not only provides rigorous privacy guaran-
tees for protecting sensitive inferences, but also retains the
utility of the perturbed data. Furthermore, we computed 95%
confidence interval for our accuracy results whose range is
less than 4.83%. These results further validate the efficacy of
DEEProtect; 2) DEEProtect achieves better utility performance
under usage mode 2 which only considers specific sensitive
inferences than that under usage mode 1 which considers the
entire set of sensitive inferences; 3) As expected, at higher
values of , there is an improvement in utility but at the cost
of degradation in privacy; 4) Even at a moderate value of
 = 5 which is a typical privacy budget in LDP (similar
values can also be found in Google’s Rappor System [30]),
the authentication accuracy under usage mode 2 is 79.58% as
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Fig. 10. The trade-off between utility and privacy for the three case studies in Section I. Compared to the useful inferences (shown as green
lines), the degradation in accuracy of the sensitive inference (shown as red lines) is much faster. For  = 5, the accuracy for the useful
inference is close to the noise free scenario (less than 10% degradation) while the sensitive inference is close to a random guess.
shown in Figure 7 which is close to the noise-free level. Note
that the neighboring databases in LDP/RLDP may differ in all
their possible tuples instead of differing in only one tuple as
in DP. Thus, the LDP/RLDP guarantee is much stronger than
DP guarantee making its typical privacy budget for balancing
utility and privacy higher than that of DP. Even though the
typical privacy budget of our approach is around  = 5,
our system is still a significant improvement over existing
SPPMs (such as ipShield [15]) that use heuristic obfuscation
techniques and do not provide any provable guarantees. The
accuracy of the sensitive inferences in Case Study 1 (activity
mode detection) is close to a random guess at these  values
as will be discussed later. This observation further validates
the effectiveness of our mechanisms.
To investigate the effectiveness of DEEProtect on real-
world mobile applications, we plot the trade-off between the
accuracy of making useful inferences versus the accuracy
of making sensitive inferences for all the three case studies
(corresponding to usage mode 2 and thus Algorithm 3 is
applied), as shown in Figure 10. We infer the useful/sensitive
inference classifier as the ridge regression classifier in Eq. 4,
by utilizing the labeled training data corresponding to the
useful/sensitive inference function. Note that our analysis are
not restricted to the ridge regression algorithm and can be
generalized to arbitrary inference methods.
Utility-Privacy Tradeoffs for Inference control: In Fig-
ure 10(a), we observe that 1) DEEProtect achieves good in-
ference performance for behavior-based authentication (useful
inference), while significantly deteriorating the activity mode
detection (sensitive inference). For privacy budget  = 5 which
is a typical privacy budget in LDP (similar values have also
been used in Google’s Rappor System [30]), the accuracy for
inferring the useful information (authentication) is larger than
80% while the accuracy for inferring sensitive information
(activity modes) drops to roughly 5% which is equivalent
to random guessing (1/20 = 5%). Therefore, DEEProtect
can achieve practical privacy while only degrading utility
performance by 10%. This provides an effective guide for
users to choose a proper value of  for real world applications;
2) higher levels of perturbation would degrade the inference
performance for both the useful and sensitive information;
3) DEEProtect is effective for defending against sensitive
inference attacks computed over sensor data. These obser-
vations demonstrate that DEEProtect works well in practice
and returns an acceptable utility performance while satisfying
provable privacy guarantees.
Similarly, for the other two case studies, the accuracy
of the sensitive inferences degrades at a much faster rate
than that of the useful inferences when more noise is added
(corresponding to a smaller privacy budget ), which further
validates the effectiveness of DEEProtect. For Case Study
2, in Figure 10(b), when  = 5, DEEProtect achieves good
performance for transportation detection (useful inference)
with accuracy higher than 78%, while significantly degrading
the identification of entered text (sensitive inference) with
accuracy less than 10%. For Case Study 3, in Figure 10(c),
when  = 5, DEEProtect achieves good performance for
speech translation (useful inference) with accuracy higher than
79%, while preventing the recognition of speaker identity
(sensitive inference) with accuracy less than 7%.
IX. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Characteristics of Our Privacy Metrics: Depending on
the mode the user chooses to operate in, DEEProtect can
provide either the rigorous LDP guarantee that protects all
sensitive inferences (usage mode 1) or our RLDP that protects
a specified subset of inferences (usage mode 2). While RLDP
provides weaker privacy guarantees than LDP, it comes with
the advantage of stronger utility properties. When applying
LDP/RLDP on mobile sensor data, the neighboring databases
may differ in all their possible tuples (i.e., all sensor recordings
across all timestamps within the same window), while the
neighboring databases in traditional DP only differ in one
tuple. Therefore, a proper privacy budget in LDP/RLDP for
balancing privacy and utility is usually higher than that of
DP (similar privacy budgets have also been explored in [23],
[30], [73].) According to the US chief scientific officer, the US
Census in 2020 is planning to have all its datasets differentially
private with  = 4, which further validates the applicability of
our privacy budget in real applications (recall Sections VIII-B).
Our privacy metrics also satisfy composition theorems and
post-processing invariant properties (recall Theorems 1, 2, 3).
Relationship between Useful and Sensitive Inferences: For
usage mode 1, the system configuration can specify as input a
set of useful/authorized inferences and all other inferences are
considered sensitive by default. For usage mode 1, the criterion
to differentiate sensitive and useful inference is identical to
prior work on DP. For usage mode 2, the system configuration
can specify a subset of inferences as being sensitive. For
usage mode 2, we use the same criterion for specifying which
inferences are acceptable as explored in previous research on
permission granting [51].
Our perturbation mechanisms are general for any possible
combination of useful and sensitive inferences. The parameter
(privacy budget) selection process, similar to traditional DP
frameworks, depends on the system’s privacy-utility tradeoff
requirement. Our Case Study 3 considers speech-to-text trans-
lation as useful inference and speaker’s identity recognition as
sensitive inference. These two inferences are closely coupled
since they both utilize MFCC and spectrogram features (recall
Section III-B). The useful and sensitive inferences of other
case studies in our experiments are also coupled. Experiments
in Section VIII-B demonstrate that our method can effectively
balance the utility and privacy for these scenarios. The reason
is that our RLDP aims to protect against a subset of sensitive
inferences, instead of all the possible sensitive inferences com-
puted over the sensor data. Therefore, even if those sensitive
inferences are closely coupled with the useful inferences, the
relaxed sensitivity ∆Qrelax in Eq. 10 is still smaller than ∆Q,
making the perturbed sensor data usable in practice. Under
situations where useful and sensitive inferences correspond to
almost disjoint features, our RLDP mechanism can enhance
the balance between utility and privacy. As the overlap in
features corresponding to the useful and sensitive inferences
increases, the performance of RLDP mechanism would de-
crease, approaching that of LDP mechanism.
Applicability and Generalizability: DEEProtect mechanisms
provide obfuscated sensor data to applications, and are thus
applicable to legacy apps as well. In contrast, the alterna-
tive paradigm of directly computing and sharing pre-defined
utilities in a differentially private way is not compatible with
legacy apps. Previous work in [72], [80] proposed to ignore
several records in the database to bound sensitivity in DP
for providing better privacy-utility tradeoffs. Our approach of
using autoencoder techniques to extract authorized features is
a conceptual improvement over these methods. While DEEP-
rotect has been presented in the context of privacy-aware data
sharing on mobile phones, the techniques developed are not
restricted to the specific setting, and can be applied to other
scenarios beyond mobile phones. We will make DEEProtect
tool available to public as open source software.
Deployment Overhead: We are working towards an imple-
mentation of the autoencoder on the Android platform using
one of the existing packages [1], [43]. Our current off-line
training process requires a small amount of labeled data. In
our experiments, we only required 20 users’ data collected
for 2 weeks, which also validates the effectiveness of our
training process. On the mobile device, DEEProtect uses the
pre-trained autoencoder model to transform data to features,
performs feature perturbation and data reconstruction. These
simple multiplication and addition operations performed on the
mobile device are fairly lightweight. In our experiments, we
found that DEEProtect-on mode consumes 2.5% more battery
power, 3.8% more CPU usage and 0.6MB more memory usage
than the DEEProtect-off mode, which is an acceptable cost
for daily usage. Therefore, DEEProtect incurs fairly low over-
head in off-line training and runtime resource consumption,
indicating its high practicality. Any DP-oriented mechanism
that adds noise to the data can risk the problem of breaking
the integrity constraints of these sensors. In practice, since
our framework targets simple sensors such as accelerometer,
gyroscope, etc., our decoding process is unlikely to break the
integrity constraints for these sensors. Therefore, smartphone
apps can continue to use the perturbed sensor data generated
by DEEProtect without any change to their existing interface.
Future Directions: While there is a non-trivial utility cost
incurred by our mechanisms, DEEProtect (under both usage
modes) significantly outperforms the baseline approach. In
addition, our utility performance can be further improved
by 1) exploiting fine-grained correlation among sensors (e.g.,
among the three dimensions of accelerometer in Case Study
1) according to [53]; 2) training customized models specific to
each individual user that installs DEEProtect in phone; and 3)
training models based on a larger amount of users’ data as in
[30]. Although our privacy guarantee is limited to segmented
sensor data, we do take the temporal dynamics existing in
mobile sensor stream into consideration according to a system-
specified parameter of window size. Our perturbation mech-
anism can also be easily generalized to consider correlation
across time windows, according to the composition properties
of our privacy metrics (refer to [23] and Theorems 1,2).
An important component of our perturbation mechanism is
the computation of the feature sensitivity in Algorithms 2,3.
Ways to accurately compute the sensitivity for arbitrary mobile
applications, and deal with its possible underestimation would
be a challenge we would like to address in the future. Our
repository of inferences in Table I can be expanded as new
useful/authorized and sensitive inferences are developed in the
future.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose DEEProtect, a general privacy-
preserving framework for inference control of time-series
sensor data on mobile devices. DEEProtect not only supports
conventional LDP guarantees, but also provides a novel re-
laxed variant of LDP. We further propose effective perturbation
mechanisms consisting of two key steps: 1) we explore novel
autoencoder models to realize data minimization and only
retain features relevant to the useful (authorized) inferences.
This prevents the leakage of any information that is orthogonal
to the useful inferences; and 2) to further enhance the privacy
of sensitive inferences, we perturb the extracted features, using
an effective obfuscation mechanism that ensures both con-
ventional and relaxed LDP guarantees while simultaneously
maintaining the utility of the data. Finally, for reasons of
compatibility with existing third-party apps, we reconstruct the
sensor data, from the noisy features before sharing. Through
theoretical analysis and extensive experiments over multiple
real-world datasets, we demonstrate that compared to the
state-of-the-art research, DEEProtect significantly improves
the accuracy for supporting mobile sensing applications while
providing provable privacy guarantees.
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XII. APPENDIX
A. Repository of Inferences
To have a better understanding for current inference-based
mobile sensing platforms, we investigate more than 70 re-
search papers published in relevant conferences and journals
over the past 6 years to form a knowledge repository in
Table I. This database captures a wide variety of inference
categories over mobile sensor data including activity mode
detection [36], [5], [76], behavior-based authentication [31],
[47], [58], [18], [78], [94], text entered [91], [62], [67], [54],
[13], [59], speaker identity recognition [52], [66], speech-to-
text translation [48], [61], [93], location [12], [45], [66],
[34] , device placement [68], onscreen taps [62], stress [55],
[16], emotion [16], [74] and environment monitoring [3],
[64], [83], [86]. While newer inferences are being made,
we do not expect the database to change rapidly. Both the
useful inferences and sensitive inferences for our systems are
currently selected from the knowledge repository in Table I.
B. Sequential Composition Theorem of RLDP
Proof for Theorem 1: For D1 and D2, let D1t = D1∩D1t and
D2t = D2∩D2t. For any sequence r of outcomes rt ∈ R(At),
applying Definition 3, the probability of output r from the
sequence of At(D1) is
P(A˜(D1) = r)
=
∏
t
P(At(D1t) = rt)
≤
∏
t
P(At(D2t) = rt)×
∏
t
exp(
t
∆D
× |D1t −D2t|)
≤P(A˜(D2) = r)× exp(
∑
t t
∆D
× |D1 −D2|)
≤P(A˜(D2) = r)× exp
(∑
t
t
)
(11)
C. Parallel Composition Theorem of RLDP
Proof for Theorem 2: For D1 and D2, let D1t = D1∪D1t and
D2t = D2∪D2t. For any sequence r of outcomes rt ∈ R(At),
applying Definition 3, the probability of output r from the
sequence of At(D1) is
P(A˜(D1) = r)
=
∏
t
P(At(D1t) = rt)
≤
∏
t
Pr(At(D2t) = rt)×
∏
t
exp(
t
∆D
× |D2t −D1t|)
≤P(A˜(D2) = r)× exp(maxt t
∆D
× |D1 −D2|)
≤P(A˜(D2) = r)× exp(max
t
t)
(12)
D. Post-processing Invariant Property of RLDP
Proof for Theorem 3: For D1 and D2,
P(f(A(D1)) = s)
=P(A(D1) = r)
≤ exp()P(A(D2) = r)
= exp()P(f(A(D2)) = s)
(13)
E. Privacy Guarantees of the Baseline Approach
For the baseline approach that adds Laplace noise with
parameter λ = dim(xt)∆Q/ to the sensor data, we have
max
xt1,xt2,o
P(A(xt1) = o)
P(A(xt2) = o)
≤ max
xt1,xt2,o
Lap(o−Q(xt1))
Lap(o−Q(xt2))
≤ max
xt1,xt2,o
exp
(
(o−Q(xt1)))
dim(xt)∆Q
)
exp
(
(o−Q(xt2)))
dim(xt)∆Q
)
≤ exp ()
(14)
The above result holds since max
xt1,xt2
‖Q(xt1)−Q(xt2)‖ =
dim(xt)∆Q (according to the composition properties of DP).
TABLE I. Summary of Existing Inferences Computed over Mobile Sensor Data.
Accelerometer Orientation Gyroscope MagneticField Microphone Camera GPS
Touch
Screen
Activity Mode Detection
attribute: walking, still, etc. [36], [5], [76]
Behavior-based Authentication
attribute: authorized user or not [47], [58], [18], [78], [94] [18], [47] [58], [94] [47], [94] [78] [78] [31], [78]
Text Entered
attribute: alphabets, digits [91], [67], [59], [62] [91], [13] [62]
Speaker Identity Recognition
attribute: user’s identity [52] [52] [52] [52] [52] [52], [66]
Speech-to-text Translation
attribute: speech to text [61] [48], [93]
Location
attribute: home, work, public [45], [34] [66] [12], [45]
Device Placement
attribute: hand, ear, pocket, bag [68]
Onscreen Taps
attribute: location of apps on screen [62] [62]
Stress
attribute: stressful or not [55], [16]
Emotion
attribute: happy, sad, fear, anger [16], [74]
Environment Monitor
attribute: place virtualization [64], [83] [83] [3], [64], [83] [3], [64], [83]
F. Privacy Guarantees of DEEProtect Under Usage Mode 1
Proof for Theorem 4: First, we have ∆ft ≤√
dim(ft)∆2ft ≤
√
dim(ft)∆2xt ≤
√
dim(ft)∆xt ≤√
dim(ft) dim(xt)∆Q, where ∆2(·) represents norm-2
distance. Thus, by setting λ =
√
dim(ft) dim(xt)∆Q
 , we have
max
ft1,ft2,o
P(A(ft1) = o)
P(A(ft2) = o)
= max
ft1,ft2,o
Lap(o−Q(ft1))
Lap(o−Q(ft2))
≤ max
ft1,ft2,o
exp
(
(o−Q(ft1)))√
dim(ft) dim(ft)∆Q
)
exp
(
(o−Q(ft2)))√
dim(ft) dim(ft)∆Q
)
≤ exp ()
(15)
Then, according to the post-processing invariance property
of LDP, we have max
xt1,xt2,o
P(A(xt1)=o)
P(A(xt2)=o) ≤ exp ().
G. Privacy Guarantees of DEEProtect Under Usage Mode 2
Proof for Theorem 5: By setting λ =√
dim(ft) dim(xt)∆Qrelaxed
 , we have
max
ft1,ft2,o
P(A(ft1) = o)
P(A(ft2) = o)
≤ max
ft1,ft2,o
Lap(o−Q(ft1))
Lap(o−Q(ft2))
≤ max
ft1,ft2,o
exp
(
(o−Q(ft1)))√
dim(ft) dim(ft)∆Qrelaxed
)
exp
(
(o−Q(ft2)))√
dim(ft) dim(ft)∆Qrelaxed
)
≤ exp ()
(16)
Therefore, according to the post-processing invariance prop-
erty of RLDP, we have max
xt1,xt2,o
P(A(xt1)=o)
P(A(xt2)=o) ≤ exp ().
H. Utility Analysis of DEEProtect Under Usage Mode 1
Proof for Theorem 6: First, we derive the variance of a
mechanism A(·) for DEEProtect under usage mode 1 as
V ar(A(xt)) =
dim(ft)∑
i=1
V ar(f ′t)
dim(xt)
2
≤dim(ft)
2
(∆ft(i))
2
dim(xt)
2
2
≤dim(ft)
4
(∆Q)2
dim(xt)
2
2
≤dim(ft)
2
(∆Q)2
dim(xt)
2
2
(17)
Its expected error is
E[|A(xt)− xt|]
≤E[‖A(xt)− E[A(xt)]‖1] + E[‖A(xt)− xt‖1]
=Re error(A(xt)) +
√
E[‖A(xt)− xt‖22]
=Re error(A(xt)) +
√
V ar(A(xt))
(18)
Note that our autoencoder based data minimization mecha-
nism would result in a negligible reconstruction error, i.e.,
Re error(A(xt)) is much lower than the expected error
caused by adding noise. Therefore, we approximate the utility
performance of DEEProtect as
Error(A) ≈ dim(ft)∆Q
dim(xt)
(19)
Similar results can also be found in [75]. The expected error
for the baseline approach can also be obtained as
E[‖LPM(xt)− xt‖1] =E[‖(Lap(∆Q/))‖1]
=∆Q/
(20)
Therefore, DEEProtect under usage mode 1 reduces the
expected error of the baseline approach with a factor of
dim(xt)/ dim(ft).
I. Utility Analysis of DEEProtect Under Usage Mode 2
Proof for Theorem 7: First, we derive the variance of a
mechanism A(·) for DEEProtect under usage mode 2 as
E[|A(xt)− xt|]
≤E[‖A(xt)− E[A(xt)]‖1] + E[‖A(xt)− xt‖1]
=Re error(A(xt)) +
√
E[‖A(xt)− xt‖22]
=Re error(A(xt)) +
√
V ar(A(xt))
(21)
Similarly, we have
Error(A) ≈ dim(ft)∆Qrelaxed
dim(xt)
(22)
Therefore, we know that DEEProtect under usage mode 2
reduces the expected error of the baseline approach with a
factor of dim(xt)∆Qdim(ft)∆Qrelaxed .
J. Existing Autoencoder Models
The mathematical formulations of existing autoencoder
models [37], [46] (expanding Eq. 3) is
min J0(W , be, bd,W
′) = min
∑T/Nw
t=1
L(xt, Dec(Enc(xt)))
+λ
∑
t,i
W 2t,i + δ
∑df
i=1
KL(ρ||ρˆi)
(23)
where the encoder function Enc(·) maps the input data xt ∈
Rdxt×1 to the hidden units (features) ft ∈ Rdft×1 according
to
ft = Enc(xt) = genc(Wxt + be) (24)
and the decoder function Dec(·) maps the outputs of the hidden
units (features) back to the original input space according to
x˜t = Dec(ft) = gdec(W
′ft + bd) (25)
Similar to most existing autoencoder models [37], [46], [88],
we choose the sigmoid function for genc(·), gdec(·), and set
W ′ = W T . L(u,v) is a loss function, typically the square
loss L(u,v) = ‖u− v‖2. The second term is a weight decay
term that helps prevent overfitting [37]. The third term is a
sparsity constraint
df∑
i=1
KL(ρ||ρˆi) (26)
with parameter ρ, where
ρˆi =
1
n
T/Nw∑
t=1
fi(xt) (27)
KL(ρ||ρˆi) is the KL divergence between two Bernoulli
random variables with mean ρ and ρˆi respectively.
K. Model Learning in Autoencoder-based Data Minimization
To solve the optimization problem in Eq. 5, we first initialize
each parameter W , be, bd,W ′, c to a small random value near
zero. Then we apply SGD [10] for iterative optimization. We
perform the feedforward pass in Eq. 5 and evaluate
zet = Wdt + be, z
d
t = W
T se(z
e
t ) + bd (28)
Next, we compute the error terms δdt , δ
e
t as
δdt =
∂L(d˜t, d(e(dt)))
∂zdt
= −( d˜t
sd(zdt )
+
1− d˜t
1− sd(zdt )
)s′d(z
d
t )
δet = (Wδ
d
t + δ(ρ/ρ˜t + (1− ρ)/(1− ρ˜t)))s′t(zet )
(29)
Finally, the gradient descents as partial derivatives can be
computed as
∂J(W , be, bd,W
′, c)
∂W
=
T∑
t=1
gdec(xt)δ
dT
t + δ
e
tx
T
t
∂J(W , be, bd,W
′, c)
∂be
=
T∑
t=1
δdt
∂J(W , be, bd,W
′, c)
∂bd
=
T∑
t=1
δet
∂J(W , be, bd,W
′, c)
∂c
=cT −
T∑
t=1
xt
(30)
Next, we modify W to satisfy the orthogonality constraint
in Eq. 5. Our method to overcome this non-convex constraint
follows the rigorous analysis in [65] by adopting a simple
operation,
W := (WW T )−
1
2W (31)
which sets the singular values of W to be all ones.
L. Model Stacking in Autoencoder-based Data Minimization
Although Algorithm 1 is effective for solving Eq. 5, the
learnt result heavily relies on the initial seeds. Therefore, we
use multiple hidden layers to stack the model in order to
achieve more stable performance. For the first layer in the
autoencoder model, we find the optimal layer by minimizing
the objective function in Eq. 5. The representations learned by
the first layer are then used as the input of the second layer,
and so on so forth. Using a stacked multi-layer autoencoder,
we can learn more stable and finer-grained features to better
represent the mobile sensor data.
